

June 24/75
4338

~~SECRET (GDS)~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT:

Intelligence Analysis of Conflict
Scenarios in Another Arab/Israeli
War

For the past year, the Intelligence Community has been engaged in a comprehensive analysis of the principal factors bearing on another Arab/Israeli war. The result has been reported in a National Intelligence Analytical Memorandum (NIAM) (Tab A) which treats several possible scenarios of renewed hostilities. The major findings of the NIAM are set forth in pages 2-17.

In brief, the NIAM concludes that in any foreseeable conflict situation, Israel will have a clear military advantage. Large quantities of advanced weapons and other military equipment--most of which have been from US inventories or production--plus new training, tactics and organization introduced since the October War have enabled Israel to improve its military posture in all areas. Moreover, Israel is continuously on a higher state of alert than existed prior to October 1973, and will thereby be less vulnerable to a surprise attack.

The most likely sequence of events in another conflict would be for Israel to preempt in anticipation of an inevitable and imminent attack by the Arabs--as it did in June 1967. Whatever scenario another war might follow, the NIAM concludes that its cost in terms of casualties will be very high for all sides. In the event that Israel is opposed by both Egypt and Syria, the NIAM estimates that Israeli casualty figures in a worst-case scenario could run as high as 36,000, about 6,000 of whom would be killed. By comparison, the Israelis suffered 2,500 dead in October 1973. The Arabs, it is estimated, would suffer about twice as many casualties. The estimated casualty figures are important in

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NSC review completed

SECRET (GDS)

- 2 -

that they tend to impact more heavily on Israel because of the much smaller population base. The NIAM thus reflects the Arab strategy of maximising Israeli casualties, a strategy Israel hopes to avoid.

The NIAM concludes that at present levels of mobilization, Israel could contain simultaneous attacks from Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon; after mobilization Israel could defend on three fronts while launching a major offensive on the fourth. It would probably knock out Syria first, then turn its attention to Egypt. In the event it attacked first, Syria might initially gain a few kilometers. However, an Israeli offensive into Syria would meet with determined resistance from well-entrenched and armed forces. On the Sinai front, Egypt might, at best, be able to reach the Mitla and Gidi passes but could not hold them against a counterattack. On the defense, Egypt could inflict heavy casualties on the Israeli forces.

In face of a well-executed Arab strategy of fall-back defense and attrition, Israel could still knock out opposing offensive capabilities within two weeks and virtually destroy opposing armies in four weeks--but would suffer an estimated 38,000 casualties. Under less unfavorable, and more likely, circumstances, with Israel imposing its preferred military strategy and tactics, it could knock out opposing offensive capabilities in about ten days, although still suffering an estimated 25,000 casualties. Israel is believed to have ample arms and munitions to fight without resupply for three to four weeks at the October 1973 levels of intensity.

Other Arab forces can, and probably would, provide military support to Syria and Egypt as they have in past conflicts. But this would be only a marginal factor. It is estimated that Jordan would commit up to one armored division to fight inside Syria (about the same as October 1973), provided there was no third front along the Jordan River (perhaps from an Israeli effort to outflank Syrian units by attacking through Jordan.) Provided its political difficulties with Syria were resolved, Iraq would probably commit two armored divisions (about the same as in October 1973). Iraq, Algeria and Libya would probably supply up to 100 combat aircraft, but this would have little effect on the outcome of the air battle, which Israel is expected to win decisively.

Egypt and Syria have Scud-B and FROG-7 tactical missiles, with ranges of 160 to 38 miles respectively, as well as some fighter-bombers which could be used against Israeli population centers. Their accuracy and

SECRET (GDS)

SECRET (GDS)

- 3 -

damage would not be great (probable civilian casualties would be in the hundreds rather than thousands,) and such an attack would almost certainly produce severe Israeli retaliation. Israel has a much more powerful and accurate strategic strike capability, relying primarily on F-4 and A-4 aircraft and, to a lesser extent, on the Jericho missile (250 mile range). It used this strategic bombing capability against Syrian economic and logistic targets in October 1973 and would probably do so even more heavily against both Egypt and Syria in renewed fighting. Israel and Egypt have chemical warfare capabilities but there are no indications either would use these in combat.

25X6

Soviet options for military intervention are limited essentially to defensive action because of modest capabilities for rapid deployment to the front of militarily effective forces (i.e. division strength and above). However, the USSR demonstrated in October 1973 its capability for large-scale military air and surface resupply of both the Syrian and Egyptian armies. This is likely in another conflict. Also, there is a precedent and a capability for direct Soviet involvement in air defense by supplying and manning both aircraft and anti-aircraft units. The USSR has the capability to provide such assistance rapidly on the Syrian front, perhaps using a core of two airborne regiments, heavily reinforced with anti-tank and anti-aircraft units. A military element of this sort could be used to establish a major strong point in the Syrian defense, and could be in place within about four days. The use of Soviet pilots and aircraft is also a possibility.

SECRET (GDS)

MEMORANDUM

4338

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET (GDS)ACTION

June 24, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM: ROBERT B. OAKLEY *RO*

SUBJECT: National Intelligence Analytical
Memorandum: Arab/Israeli Hostilities

As you are aware, the Intelligence Community has been working for a considerable period of time on various studies connected with the possible resumption of hostilities in the Middle East. In the past few months, and particularly since the initiation of our reassessment, it has taken a comprehensive look at the anticipated military development of another Arab/Israeli war by thinking through various types of conflict scenarios. Its findings, which have been generally concurred by the USIB, have now been published as a National Intelligence Analytical Memorandum (NIAM).

This NIAM is a considerable improvement on the earlier one on the same subject published last November. 25X1, 5X1

the CIA, with our encouragement, have seen to it that the scenarios of a defensive, attrition-oriented war by the Arabs and of Soviet intervention have been examined thoroughly. In the past, both tended to be given the once-over-lightly, at best.

The NIAM is attached at Tab I-A under cover of a suggested memorandum to the President which illuminates its more important findings. The entire NIAM is a highly professional piece of work dealing with a contingency of major importance to the US. The President may only wish to review the NIAM's major conclusions (p. 2-17) but it is worth reading in full, should time be available.

RECOMMENDATION: That you forward the Memorandum to the President attached at Tab I.

APPROVE _____

DISAPPROVE _____

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BYAUTH: RBOakley

Secret

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ANALYTICAL MEMORANDUM

Arab-Israeli Hostilities

Secret

NIAM 35/36-2-75
13 June 1975

No

1

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET (GDS)INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: Intelligence Analysis of Conflict
Scenarios in Another Arab/Israeli War

Since the middle of last year, the Intelligence Community has been analyzing the principal factors included in, and the likely result of, another Arab/Israeli war. After several earlier studies, it has now produced a highly professional National Intelligence Analytical Memorandum (NIAM) studying the subject broadly and examining in detail the scenarios of several possible contingencies should there be a resumption of hostilities. The major findings of the NIAM are set forth in pages 2-17, but the entire study is worth reading should you have time.

In brief, the NIAM concludes that in any foreseeable conflict situation, Israel will have the clear military advantage. Large quantities of advanced weapons and other military equipment--most of which has been from US inventories or production--plus new training, tactics and organization introduced since the October War have enabled Israel to improve its military posture in all areas. Moreover, Israel is continuously on a higher state of alert than existed prior to October 1973, and will thereby be less vulnerable to a surprise attack. In fact, in the event of another conflict, the most likely course of events would be for Israel to preempt in anticipation of an inevitable and imminent attack by the Arabs--as it did in June 1967.

Whatever scenario the course of another war might take, the NIAM concludes that its cost in terms of casualties will be very high for all sides. In the event that Israel is opposed by both Egypt and Syria, the NIAM estimates that Israeli casualty figures in a worst-case scenario could run as high as 36,000, about 6,000 (16%) of whom would be killed. By comparison, the Israelis suffered 2,500 dead

SECRET (GDS)

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-2-

in October 1973. The Arabs, it is estimated, would take about twice as many casualties by Israel. The estimated casualty figures are important in that they tend to impact more heavily on Israel, less so on the Arabs. The NIAM thus reflects the Arab strategy of maximizing Israeli casualties, a strategy Israel is determined to avoid.

The NIAM concludes that, in the event it attacked first, Syria might gain a few initial kilometers of Israeli counterattacks. However, an Israeli offensive into Syria would meet with determined resistance from well-entrenched and armed forces. On the Sinai front, Egypt might, at best, be able to reach the Mitla and Gidi passes but could not hold them against a counterattack. On the defense, Egypt could inflict heavy casualties on the Israeli forces. At present levels of mobilization, Israel could contain simultaneous attacks from Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon; after mobilization Israel could defend on three fronts while launching a major offensive on the fourth. It would probably knock out Syria first, then turn its attention to Egypt.

In face of a well-executed Arab strategy of fall-back defense and attrition, Israel could still knock out opposing offensive capabilities within two weeks and virtually destroy opposing armies in four weeks--but would suffer an estimated 38,000 casualties. Under less unfavorable, and more likely circumstances, with Israel imposing its preferred military strategy and tactics, it could knock out opposing offensive capabilities in about ten days, although still suffering an estimated 25,000 casualties. Israel is believed to have ample arms and munitions to fight for three to four weeks without resupply at the October 1973 level of intensity.

Other Arab forces can, and probably would, provide military support to Syria and Egypt as they have in past conflicts. But this would be only a marginal factor. It is estimated that Jordan would commit up to one armored division to fight inside Syria (about the same as October 1973), provided there was no third front along the Jordan River (possibly resulting from an Israeli effort to outflank Syrian units by attacking through Jordan.) Provided its political difficulties with Syria were resolved, Iraq would probably commit two armored divisions (about the same as in October 1973). Iraq, Algeria and Libya would probably supply up to 100 combat aircraft, but this would have little effect on the outcome of the air battle which Israel is expected to win decisively.

SECRET (GDS)

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-3-

Egypt and Syria have Scud-B and FROG-7 tactical, non-nuclear missiles with respective ranges of 160 to 38 miles, as well as some fighter-bombers which could be used against Israeli population centers. Their accuracy and damage would not be great (probable civilian casualties would be in the hundreds rather than thousands,) and would almost certainly produce severe Israeli retaliation. Israel has a much more powerful and accurate strategic strike capability, relying primarily on F-4 and A-1 aircraft but also possessing the Jericho missile (250 mile range). It used this strategic bombing capability against Syrian economic and logistic targets in October 1973 and would probably do so even more heavily against both Egypt and Syria in renewed fighting. Israel and Egypt have chemical warfare capabilities but there are no indications either would use this in combat.

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Soviet options for military intervention are limited essentially to defensive action because of limited capabilities for rapid deployment to the front of military effective forces (i.e. division strength and above). However, the USSR demonstrated in October 1973 its capability for large-scale military air and resupply of both the Syrian and Egyptian armies. This is very likely in another conflict. Also, there is a precedent and a capability for direct Soviet involvement in air defense, supplying and manning both aircraft and anti-aircraft units. The USSR has the capability to provide such assistance rapidly on the Syrian front, perhaps using a core of two airborne regiments, heavily reinforced with anti-tank and anti-aircraft units. A military element of this sort could be used to establish a major strong point in the Syrian defense, and could be in place within about four days. The use of Soviet pilots and aircraft is also a possibility.